# EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROUTING SLIP

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### UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

February 8, 1985

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW)

CW .7 FEB 1985

Here are my thoughts on how we might better tackle the CW proliferation problem, as you requested Tuesday morning. The CW Interagency Group, chaired by Jack Chain, should be invigorated to consider and flesh out the approach outlined below on a priority basis. Jack concurs with this approach.

Your personal commitment to this effort will be key. This could usefully include a speech by you in the spring to raise knowledge and concern about this problem.

This "consciousness-raising" is badly needed. More attention must be focussed on the fact that chemical weapons are a growing problem. In 1963, we estimated only five countries possessed them. Now, we estimate at least thirteen states have them and others are trying to get them. As you know, the problem is particularly acute in the Middle East.

Steps to slow down, if not reverse, this proliferation should not impede progress toward a comprehensive CW ban. Indeed, CW non-proliferation efforts and our negotiating efforts in Geneva should be mutually reinforcing.

The following suggestions take advantage of what we have learned in the nuclear non-proliferation area. Stemming CW proliferation can be even more difficult than stemming nuclear proliferation. Chemical industries and dual-use chemicals are more pervasive in economies around the world and CW involves lower level technology and much less cost than nuclear weapons.

An integrated strategy for dealing with this problem should focus on three major components:

- o raising consciousness that there is a mounting problem and that developed nations have a special obligation;
- expanding and improving our intelligence base and the interaction between intelligence and policy sectors; and
- o taking bilateral and multilateral actions to deal with problem countries and to curb exports.



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#### Consensus Building

Ironic as it sounds, we must convince our friends and others that CW proliferation is an urgent and serious problem that must be dealt with now. This requires a diplomatic strategy and a public diplomacy strategy (speeches, articles, etc.).

In this process, we must show that the problem can be effectively managed without disrupting legitimate commerce. (The chemical industry has proven cooperative thus far, in part because it does not want its reputation blackened by association with chemical weapons.) We should also make sure that our own export controls and military assistance practices are as good as possible to ensure credibility.

#### Intelligence

I believe that CW intelligence needs a higher priority and more resources. In addition, we need a better and quicker joining of policy and intelligence considerations.

In the nuclear area, we have for years had a highly effective interagency group (at the working level) to coordinate intelligence and policy matters on sensitive proliferationrisk issues and countries. We need an analog in the CW area. To be effective, it needs information. That underscores the need to give higher priority to CW proliferation intelligence gathering. The Administration's response to the Quayle Amendment (due March 15) should reflect our expanded needs.

#### Bilateral And Multilateral Actions

We need a three-tiered approach: government-to-government efforts, complementary efforts in the CW quadrilateral (UK, FRG, France and US), and possible actions in the OECD Chemicals Group.

Besides consensus building, our government-to-government and quadrilateral efforts should aim at:

- stopping or at least significantly slowing CW-related exports to particular problem countries; and
- o building a political basis for informal and possibly more formal export controls by others and for related actions within the OECD.

We should use intelligence to support prompt, private diplomatic demarches to interrupt or prevent undesirable exports or other CW-related developments. Our experience in the case of Iraq demonstrates that a high degree of success can be achieved from such approaches and that OECD governments can usually find a way to restrict objectionable activities if they see the need to do so.

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We should work closely with key Allies and, as in the nuclear non-proliferation area, we should develop a continuing dialogue with the Soviets on the CW problem and proposed actions.

As we work toward a consensus among major countries, we could consider initiating some action within the OECD Chemicals Group to obtain more insight into the views of European countries with which the OECD works closely. At the very least, the OECD affords another way of alerting major suppliers to the problem.

In all our efforts, stemming the spread of chemical weapons should be put forth as the principle objective. Realistically, however, we must acknowledge that this is mainly a way of buying time and delaying development. But buying time can be important. Perhaps more important, the whole effort will, if done right, have the effect of strengthening the barriers against the use of chemical weapons.

Kenneth L. Adelman

cc: William J. Casey : ~ Robert C. McFarlane

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